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Finance and Growth for Microenterprises: 
Evidence from Rural China 
 
Abstract 
Using a survey dataset of Chinese rural households, we find that access to external finance is 
positively associated with the decision to become entrepreneur and the initial investment for 
microenterprises. Also, we find that the use of informal finance, especially financing from 
friends and family, is positively associated with sales growth of microenterprises with 
employees, but not of self-employed. We do not find any significant relationship between the 
use of formal finance and firm growth. Our findings underline the importance of finance for 
entrepreneurship and microenterprise growth, and the role of informal finance in the absence 
of efficient formal financial institutions.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Firms face multiple growth constraints in developing countries, including the lack of access 
to markets, decrepit energy and transportation infrastructure, and lack of security. A large and 
still growing literature, however, has documented the importance of financing constraints for 
small firms, especially in less developed countries (Ayyagari et al., 2008; Beck et al., 2005). 
A recent controversy has focused on the relative importance of formal versus informal 
financial providers for alleviating firms’ financing constraints in developing countries. Allen 
et al. (2005) posit that alternative financing channels, such as internal financing and trade 
credit as well as informal coalitions of firms, investors, and local governments are more 
important than formal bank credit in fostering the growth of private Chinese enterprises, 
while Ayyagari et al. (2010) show that it is bank rather than informal financing that fosters 
firm growth in China. Even less is known, however, about micro- or household-based 
enterprises,1 especially in rural China.  
This paper gauges the importance of informal and formal financing sources for 
microenterprises in rural China. Using a unique household survey conducted in 2009, we 
relate the decision to start a microenterprise and its success to different gauges of access to 
and use of informal and formal financing. In doing so, this paper complements recent studies 
that focus on small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), mostly in urban areas of China.  
Access to finance, whether from informal or formal sources, may alleviate credit 
constraints for both the initial investment of microenterprises and their subsequent expansion. 
There are important differences, however, between informal and formal finance, related to 
                                                   
1
 Micro-enterprises are typically firms that are smaller than the small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
with few employees and often without formal status. For a formal definition in the Chinese context, see footnote 
9. 
3 
 
screening and enforcement mechanisms (Jain, 1999). Banks rely on hard information such as 
financial reporting, often require collateral which is scarce in rural areas, and rely on 
government and courts for enforcement, while informal lenders rely on soft information, 
which is often proprietary, and on personal networks, and enforce loan contracts through 
reputation, social sanction, and coercion (Besley and Levenson, 1996).  
Given the lack of formal financial statements, microenterprises face severe 
information asymmetries in developing countries, which hinder the credit availability from 
formal financial institutions, such as banks and credit cooperatives. Informal finance may 
therefore be essential for microenterprises in China under its special economic and legal 
institutions (Allen et al., 2005) and especially in rural areas that have experienced a 
withdrawal of formal financial institutions since the mid-1990s. On the other hand, formal 
finance might be more effective in alleviating financing constraints, as informal finance 
carries high interest rates, is of limited scale, and has pro-cyclical trends.2 It is therefore a-
priori not clear whether micro- and household-based enterprises can benefit more from 
informal or formal financing sources in rural China, which leaves the question for empirical 
research.  
The evidence on the effect of informal versus formal finance on firm growth is mixed 
in the literature. On the one hand, Allen et al. (2005) show that alternative financing channels 
and governance mechanisms support a high growth of the private sector in China. Degryse et 
al. (2013) show that co-funding of informal and formal finance is an optimal financing choice 
for firm growth in China as the informal finance has an information advantage while the 
formal finance has a cost advantage. On the other hand, Ayyagari et al. (2010) use a survey of 
                                                   
2
 Hernández-Trillo et al. (2005) show that microenterprises using bank loans, moneylenders, and trade credit for 
startup, are more efficient than those relying on family, friends, and self-owned fund. 
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private firms in China, and find that bank finance is associated with faster growth while 
informal finance is not.3 Cheng and Degryse (2010) show that the development of banks has 
a positive impact on provincial economic growth in China, while non-bank financial 
institutions do not.  
We use data from a survey undertaken in 2009 of almost 2,000 households across 
nine counties in three provinces, 27 percent of which run microenterprises. This allows us to 
explore both the covariates of the decision to start a microenterprise and the role that the use 
of informal and formal financial service plays in the growth process of microenterprises. 
Our results suggest that, controlling for characteristics of the family head and village 
characteristics, wealthier households with larger families and located closer to financial 
institutions are more likely to start microenterprises, and also have higher initial investment. 
In addition, we find that higher use of informal finance, especially funding from friends and 
family, is associated with higher sales growth for microenterprises with employees, while it 
has no effect for the self-employed. The use of formal finance, on the other hand, is not 
associated with higher sales growth, which is consistent with the inefficiency of bank loans in 
China (Bailey, Huang and Yang, 2011). These findings confirm the importance of finance for 
entrepreneurship and firm growth, but also underline the important role that informal 
financial service providers play in the absence of efficient formal financial institutions. 
Our paper contributes to the literature by using firm- and household-level survey data 
to explore the relationship between access to and use of financial services and the behavior of 
microenterprises. Beck et al. (2005) show that the small firms’ growth rates are most 
constrained by financial, legal, and corruption obstacles, while financial and institutional 
                                                   
3
 Robb and Robinson (2012) find that entrepreneurs rely heavily on bank financing, and less extensively on 
funding from family members and friends in their firms’ initial year of operation in the US. 
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development weakens these constraining effects, from which the small firms benefit the most. 
Beck et al. (2014) show that banking systems with more effective credit information sharing 
and higher branch penetration can help reduce the informality of enterprises. In addition, 
access to financial services can help new entrepreneurs survive beyond the first year, as 
evidence from Bosnia and Herzegovina shows (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2009), and can help 
enterprises innovate at a faster rate (Ayyagari et al., 2011). Furthermore, using subnational 
data for Italy, Guiso et al. (2004) show that local financial development enhances the 
probability that an individual starts a business, favors the entry of new firms, and promotes 
growth, and these effects are weaker for larger firms. We contribute to this literature by 
adding empirical evidence on the microenterprises in rural China.  
While our paper’s inference is based on household survey data, our paper is also 
related to a series of recent randomized control trials that explore the effect of interventions 
alleviating micro-entrepreneurs’ financing constraints.4 De Mel et al. (2008) use shocks to 
capital stock through randomized grants in Sri Lanka, and find that the average real return to 
capital is much higher than the market interest rate, while a similar exercise in Philippines 
that expanded credit to micro-entrepreneurs did not show any positive effect on borrowers’ 
business (Karlan and Zinman, 2011). More recent evidence has shown differential effects of 
credit on individuals and households with different characteristics, linked with different uses 
of credit. Specifically, Banerjee et al. (2013) and Crepon et al. (2011) use randomized 
controlled trials in India and Morocco, respectively, and show that only some clients use 
microcredit loans to start up enterprises. New clients that did not start businesses consumed 
more non-durable goods, with existing businesses reducing consumption and increasing 
savings.  
                                                   
4
 See Karlan and Morduch (2010) for a literature survey on the randomized controlled experiments on 
microenterprises. 
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Our paper relies on household survey data and thus faces the constraints of not being 
able to infer causality from cross-sectional data. On the other hand, we capture a larger array 
of financial service providers across a broader geographic area than randomized controlled 
trials can capture. While randomized controlled trials can often provide a cleaner 
identification on the effect of finance, they are also restricted in external validity as the 
experiments are often conducted in a specific location with limited participant groups. Being 
aware of the caveats with respect to survey data, we try to provide some first evidence on the 
role of finance plays for the rural microenterprises in China. As we do not have a clear 
instrument for the access to or use of finance, we describe our findings as correlations and 
associations rather than implying causality. Given the limited availability of data for rural 
China, however, we think that our findings still provide useful insights.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an introduction to the Chinese rural 
financial market. Section 3 introduces data and summary statistics, and develops the 
hypotheses and methodology. Section 4 presents the results, and section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. RURAL FINANCIAL MARKETS IN CHINA 
 
Although China has had an annual GDP growth rate of around ten percent during the past 
three decades, rural areas have lagged behind urban areas, and the gap has been widening 
over the past decade. During the 1980s and 1990s, the rural areas were the engine of China’s 
high economic growth, especially the town and village enterprises which were collectively 
owned by community governments (Jin and Qian, 1998). However, rural enterprises have 
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witnessed a sharp decline since the mid-1990s due to a wave of bankruptcies and 
privatization. In contrast, the privatization of state-owned firms in the urban areas since the 
late 1990s has shifted the urban economy to a higher growth track. Non-farming activities in 
the rural areas are often undertaken by private microenterprises, and a large labor force has 
migrated to the urban areas for jobs since the mid-1990s. The outflow of labor force, most 
often young and talented, contributed to a further contraction of the rural economy in China.  
The expression “microenterprise” is often interchangeably used with Getihu in the 
Chinese context. However, the Chinese law (i.e. Provisions on the individual industrial and 
commercial households, enacted in 1987 and revised in 2011) stipulates an official definition 
of microenterprises according to the total assets, sales revenue and number of employees by 
industries (see footnote 9 for details). In contrast, Getihu is a registration type for firms with 
certain characteristics, e.g. with less than eight employees. According to the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce of China , there were only 140,000 Getihu in 1978, 
while the number rocketed to more than 40 million with more than 80 million employees in 
2013. These firms have substantial obstacles in obtain bank finance, while they rely heavily 
on the alternative financing channels such as family members and friends.  
Generally speaking, there are three types of financial institutions serving the rural 
credit market: the Agriculture Bank of China  (ABC) which is a commercial bank, Rural 
Credit Cooperatives (RCCs), and the Agriculture Development Bank of China  (ADBC) 
which is a policy bank. However, financial institutions, including the state-owned ABC and 
ADBC, have witnessed a contraction of branches and business in the rural area since the mid-
1990s, which resulted in RCCs as the only provider of formal finance in most rural areas.5 
RCCs, however, are often plagued by an unclear ownership structure and poor risk 
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 See Xie (2003) for an overview of the reform of RCCs in China.  
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management, which often results in substantial non-performing loans6 and even bankruptcies. 
Furthermore, RCCs usually focus on agricultural production loans, while loans to 
microenterprises only constitute a small proportion in its portfolio.7 Although China Post 
Saving Bank (CPSB) has expanded its branches in the rural area since its inception in 2007, 
they were quite focused on attracting deposits instead of extending loans up until 2009. The 
CPSB got the approval for corporate businesses in 2008, and it initiated micro-credit and 
individual business loans in 2009. The CPSB has developed dramatically in recent years, e.g. 
with more than four million micro-credit customers in 2012. However, the loan business of 
the CPSB was still quite pre-mature in 2008 (the year of our survey), which made it less of a 
concern for our survey data. Appendix 3 provides an overview of the laws and regulations on 
the rural financial system over the past two decades as well as major policy initiatives. In a 
nutshell, in spite of numerous changes and reforms in rural finance microenterprises face 
substantial obstacles in the access to formal finance in rural China.  
A major obstacle in obtaining formal finance for rural households is the lack of 
collateralizable assets in the rural area. All the rural land is owned by the collectives (i.e. 
village governments), while farmers do not have full property rights on their houses. 
Generally speaking, houses can only be traded among farmers within the same village, which 
prevents their use as collateral for bank loans. On the other hand, financial institutions usually 
do not accept movable property, such as tractors, as collateral in the rural area due to the 
cumbersome registration and enforcement problems. Consequently, financial institutions 
mainly serve as depositary tool, which leads to a substantial surplus between the deposit and 
                                                   
6
 The non-performing loan ratio of RCCs at the end of Sep 2004 was 23.50 percent, while it decreased to 7.70 
percent at the end of Mar 2010. Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission and the People’s Bank of China.  
7
 The proportion of agriculture related loans was 65.38 percent at the end of 2010. Source: the People’s Bank of 
China.  
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loans outstanding for RCCs. An outflow of credit from the rural area to the urban area widens 
the urban-rural gap.  
Due to a lack of formal finance, farmers resort to informal sources, i.e. family 
members, friends, informal financial institutions, suppliers, and other sources, etc. Informal 
financial institutions (e.g. underground banks, loan sharks, moneylenders, and ROSCAs) 
have been prohibited during 1949-1978 due to their usury characteristics. Informal financial 
institutions have revived after the country’s transition to the market economy after 1978. 
ROSCAs are widely used by entrepreneurs in the rural area of South China, e.g. hui in 
Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong (Tsai, 2002), although they are not sanctioned by the 
financial authorizes in the country. ROSCAs have various formats in different regions, such 
as Biaohui (tender for fund use), Lunhui (predetermined order for fund use) or Yaohui 
(random draw for fund use) (Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2010). The 
members of ROSCAs are often women living within the same village (Tsai, 2002).  
Recently, microfinance (or micro-credit) programs have witnessed a dramatic 
development in China. The first microfinance programs were piloted in early 1990s, while 
the government adopted a series of enhancing policies subsequently. The Peoples’ Bank of 
China initiated the pilot microfinance programs in the rural area in four provinces in 2005, 
and the first law for micro-credit companies was enacted in 2008 (Appendix 3).  According to 
the People’s Bank of China, there were 7,398 micro-credit companies with 760 billion RMB 
loans outstanding in Sep 2013; besides, 800 village banks, 337 rural commercial banks, and 
more than 100 rural cooperative banks, were often engaged in microfinance. The total assets 
of the above financial institutions have reached two trillion RMB in China in Sep 2013. 
However, Tsai (2004) shows that the intended clients of microfinance continue to use 
informal finance in rural China, whose persistence may be due to the limited supply of formal 
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credit and the institutional weaknesses of many microfinance programs. Micro-credit usually 
does not have collateral and the interest rate is often quite high, which makes it resemble the 
loans from informal financial institutions. Unfortunately, the survey questionnaire did not ask 
about microfinance separately, and it was believed to be recorded as loans from informal 
financial institution.  
The Chinese government tightened monetary policy in 2007 by raising the reserve 
deposit rate and basis interest rate, which lasted up until Sep 2008. It made manufacturing 
firms face substantial obstacles in obtaining bank finance while the interest rate hike 
worsened the situation. Many firms were forced to access alternative financing channels, e.g. 
family members and friends, informal financial institutions, trade credits, etc. The interest 
rate of informal financial institutions rocketed to a historical high level, e.g. in the city of 
Wenzhou, the interest rate of informal finance increased from 10 percent to about 20 percent 
during 2007-2008 (Zhang et al., 2013). Although we do not have sufficient data on the 
interest rate from the survey, we will distinguish the informal finance from family members 
and friends versus informal financial institutions.  
  
3. DATA, HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This section describes the survey data, discusses the different hypotheses and econometric 
methodology we will use to test them, and presents descriptive statistics.  
We use a unique survey dataset for Chinese rural households (the “Rural Finance 
Survey”), conducted in 2009 by National School of Development at Peking University and 
funded by the Citibank. The survey was conducted by a research group led by Prof. Xinqiao 
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Ping at Peking University, and the third author of this paper led the surveyors in Hunan 
province. The data has been used in Ma and Yang (2011), and we obtain the rights to use the 
data due to the author’s participation in the survey. The survey covered three provinces in 
China, Heilongjiang (Northeast), Hunan (Central), and Yunnan (Southwest).8 Three counties 
were selected from each province, and three villages were selected from each county. This 
resulted in a final sample of 1,951 households across three provinces, nine counties and 81 
villages. Provinces and counties were chosen based on representativeness, and villages and 
households are sampled randomly from the name lists. The sample distribution of households 
by region is shown in Panel A of Appendix 1. The questionnaire recorded detailed 
information on formal finance (loans from banks and rural credit cooperatives) and informal 
finance (loans from family, friends, and informal financial institutions, trade credit, and other 
sources), both at the startup year and the end of 2008 for microenterprises.9 In addition, 
demographic, income, and wealth profiles of households are also recorded in the survey 
questionnaire. All variables definitions are listed in Table 1.  
[Table 1 here] 
                                                   
8
 These provinces are less developed than other provinces in the southeast part of China, and also ranks lower in 
terms of business environment. Accordingly to the indicators in “Doing Business in China 2008” by the World 
Bank, the northeast/central/southwest part of China ranks lower than the southeast part in the easiness of doing 
business, e.g. starting a business, registering property, getting credit, and enforcing contracts.  
9
 According to the “SMEs Promotion Law of China”, the threshold of sales revenue (or number of employees) 
for microenterprises is listed as follows by industry: under 500,000 RMB for agriculture, forestry, husbandry, 
and fishery industry; under three million RMB for manufacturing industry (or less than 20 employees); under 
three million RMB for construction industry; under ten million RMB for wholesale industry (or less than five 
employees); under one million RMB for retail, catering, information technology, leasing, and business service 
industry (or less than ten employees); under two million RMB for transportation, storage and post industry (or 
less than 20 employees); under five million RMB for property management industry (or less than 100 
employees); under one million RMB for real estate industry. All other industries are categorized by the number 
of employees with a threshold of ten. Among all sample firms that report sales revenue in 2008, all but one of 
them are microenterprises according to the thresholds of either the sales revenue or the number of employees, i.e. 
the enterprise has 300 employees and belongs to “other” industry. We also cross check the definition by the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, i.e. “Categorization method for large, medium, small enterprises, and 
microenterprises” released in 2011, and identify the same enterprise. We exclude this enterprise in our sample.  
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Table 2 shows some summary statistics of the dataset. Among the 1,951 households 
surveyed 533 (27 percent) have a microenterprise. The sample distribution by industry is 
presented in Panel B of Appendix 1. Among the microenterprises, 70 percent have only the 
entrepreneur himself / herself, i.e. are self-employed. Among the 144 enterprises with 
employees, the mean (median) value of the number of employees is 8.37 (2), while the largest 
enterprise has 300 employees. The sample mean (median) value of the initial investment is 
50,967 (10,000) RMB, which is about 7,473 (1,466) USD. The sample mean (median) value 
of the household income is 20,857 (11,000) RMB in 2007. Compared with the annual 
household income, initial investments are thus substantially large which indicates the need 
for external financing. Average growth of microenterprises between 2007 and 2008 was six 
percent, with a standard deviation of 37 percent, and ranging from -217 to 249 percent.  
[Table 2 here] 
The survey provides us with several gauges of access to and use of informal and 
formal financial services. The use of informal and formal external finance is measured by 
dummy variables indicating whether a microenterprise has loans outstanding from informal 
financial institutions or family members and friends (informal finance), and banks or rural 
credit cooperatives (formal finance). At the startup year of microenterprises, 39 percent used 
informal finance and 16 percent used formal finance, while 52 percent did not use any 
external financing sources. In contrast, at the end of 2008, 19 percent used informal finance, 
while 12 percent of microenterprises used formal finance. Appendix 2 shows the loan sources 
by region and industry both for the startup year and 2008 year end.  
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We also have several proxies for the access to financial services. First, we use the 
wealth of households, as measured by the value of durable goods10 as a gauge of internal 
funds and proxy for possible collateral. Household wealth varies from zero to 684,182 RMB 
(about 100,000 USD), and the average value is 10,916 RMB (about 1,600 USD).11 Second, 
we use the distance from the nearest financial institution to measure the access to finance. 
This might not only proxy for the geographic proximity to the formal financial institution, but 
also for proximity to the informal financial institutions. Informal and formal financial service 
providers cluster geographically in order to facilitate the banks' collection of soft information 
(Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010), and it can lead to a higher accessibility of bank loans for 
informal lenders which may be further intermediated to the final borrowers (Bose, 1998; Hoff 
and Stiglitz, 1997). As a result, it will lead to a positive association between the distance to 
informal and formal financial institutions. On average, households are 4.50 kilometers from 
the nearest formal financial institution. Third, we use several gauges of the access to funds 
from family members and friends, including the amount of gifts the household has received 
and given, the family size, and the number of family members and friends that are potential 
lenders. The amount of gifts received and given ranges from zero to 200,500 RMB with an 
average of 3,689 RMB. Table 2 shows that the family size, or rather, the number of family 
                                                   
10
 In the survey questionnaire, the following items are included as durable goods: vehicle; tractor; motor or 
electro tricycle; other transportation tool; pump; other agriculture machine; motorcycle; electro bicycle; color 
TV; refrigerator; wash machine; computer; mobile phone; air conditioning; microwave oven; induction cooker; 
water heater; video recorder; audio system. Following the literature on depreciation rate of physical capital 
(0.106 by Bischoff and Kokkelenberg (1987); 0.126 by Epstein and Denny (1980); 0.100 by Ping et al. (2012)), 
we use an annual depreciation rate of ten percent calculated in a compound style from the initial purchase year 
to year 2008. We assume that all durable goods at the end of 2008 were purchased in the initial purchase year. 
As durable goods may be purchased after the initial purchase year and the purchase price is often increasing 
over the years, we are estimating a lower bound for the wealth of households at the end of 2008 in the above. In 
contrast, we can calculate an upper bound value of household wealth by treating all durable goods at the end of 
2008 with the purchasing price at 2009 (current price) without any depreciation. Similarly, we can also estimate 
household wealth at the startup year of the microenterprises.  
11
 The exchange rate on Dec 31st 2008 was 6.82 RMB / USD. Source: Industrial and Commercial Bank of China  
http://www.icbc.com.cn  
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members, ranges from one to eleven with an average of 4.12. The number of family members 
and friends that are potential lenders ranges from zero to 200 with an average of 6.98.  
As households’ ability to access informal and formal sources of finance might be 
correlated with other family head characteristics, the relationship between access to finance 
and the decision to establish an enterprise and its growth might be spurious when ignoring 
these characteristics. Liu (2005) shows that the Hukou registration (registered as urban / rural 
citizens) is related with the career choice, i.e. rural citizens are less likely to work in the state 
sector jobs, and more likely to be self-employed. Li et al. (2008) show that the communist 
party membership can help private entrepreneurs obtain bank loans and further enhance firm 
performance in China. Age, education and gender are often related with human capital 
(Becker, 1993), which may also affect the behavior of microenterprises in rural China. We 
therefore control for an array of family head characteristics, which include Hukou registration, 
age, high school education or above, communist party membership, and gender of family 
head. Specifically, six percent of family heads have an urban Hukou registration; the average 
age is 49.50 years; twelve percent have an education of high school or above; ten percent 
have communist party membership; and seven percent of household heads are females.  
Village characteristics might also be important for the decision to become an 
entrepreneur. Fan et al. (2004) show that increased government investment in infrastructure 
may reduce rural poverty by creating improved employment opportunities in the nonfarm 
sector in China. As a result, we also control for an array of village characteristics, including 
access to running water, arable land per capita, and access to bus service in the village. Table 
2 shows that 69 percent of villages have access to running water service; the average arable 
land per capita in the village is 0.92 Mu (about 0.15 Acre); and 39 percent of villages have 
access to bus service.  
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Using this household survey, this paper tests several hypotheses related to 
microenterprises’ access to different financing sources. Firstly, we gauge the extent to which 
the decision to establish a microenterprise (i.e. entrepreneurship) is associated with access to 
informal and formal financing sources. As initial investments for the microenterprises often 
surpass self-owned funds, households need to borrow additional funds from informal or 
formal sources. Access to finance may enhance the decision to become entrepreneurs in rural 
areas by providing supplementary funds for initial investments for microenterprises.  
We use the following probit model to test the hypothesis on the entrepreneurship and 
the access to finance: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
(1) 
where i stands for a household, j for village, and k for county and                equals 1 
if a household has a microenterprise, 0 otherwise. On the right hand side, we have three 
categories of variables: family head characteristics (Hukou Urban, Head Age, Political 
Connection, Senior Education, and Female), family characteristics (Durable Goods, Travel 
Time to Financial Institution, Family Members and Friends as Potential Lenders, Gift, and 
Family Size), and village characteristics (Running Water, Land Per Capita in the Village, and 
Bus). The county dummies control for other important cultural and socio-economic 
differences across counties and provinces that are not captured by the village-level variables. 
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   is the heteroskedasticity robust error term.  Given the binary nature of the dependent 
variable, Microenterprise, the regressions are run with the probit model.  
Secondly, we relate the size of the initial investment to access to informal and formal 
financing sources. While initial investments mainly depend on the industry of 
microenterprises, access to finance may also affect their size. We use the following OLS 
regression model: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
(2) 
where l denotes industries. Initial Investment is the logarithm of 1 plus the amount of initial 
investment in RMB at the startup year of a microenterprise. By using logs, we can interpret 
the coefficient estimates as elasticities. In addition to all family head characteristics, family 
characteristics, and village characteristics in equation (1), we add a village-level variable to 
the initial investment equation (2), Competitors at Startup Year. We also include county and 
industry specific fixed effects, thus controlling for different investment levels across different 
counties and, critically, across different industries.  
Finally, access to finance may also be related to the growth of microenterprises after 
the startup year. Microenterprises with employees may have more investment if they have 
access to finance (both informal and formal financing sources) and consequently a higher 
growth rate. However, those without employees may be run for subsistence purpose, and 
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never grow even with sufficient access to finance. Following Ayyagari et al. (2010) and Beck 
et al. (2005), we gauge whether firms’ sales growth is associated with the access to informal 
and formal financing sources. To test this hypothesis we utilize the following OLS regression: 
                                                                                                                                                                           
(3) 
The growth of microenterprise is measured by annual sales growth rate during 2007-
2008; Finance includes a set of variables indicating the use of informal or formal finance; 
Self-Employed is equals one if there are no employees except for the entrepreneur himself / 
herself. We include the same set of control variables as in previous models, plus several firm 
characteristics, including Firm Size – measured as the logarithm of 1 plus the sales in 2007 – 
and Firm Age – measured as the logarithm of the number of years since start-up. As before, 
county and industry dummies are included in equation (3) to control for growth differences 
across counties and industries, orthogonal to the decisions of the individual microenterprises.  
 Table 3 shows the correlation coefficients between the variables. Panel A shows the 
correlation coefficients for all households, while Panel B shows the subsample results for the 
households with microenterprises. Panel A shows that households with more wealth in 
durable goods, higher amounts of gifts received and given, larger family size, and those with 
a head having urban Hukou registration and high school or above education, are more likely 
to start a microenterprise. In contrast, households located far away from formal financial 
institutions, residing in villages without access to running water and bus service, lower arable 
land per capita, and those with an older or female head are less likely to start a 
microenterprise. Panel B shows that all finance variables are positively correlated with sales 
growth except the use of informal finance in the startup year, although all correlation 
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coefficients are statistically insignificant. In addition, all finance variables at startup year are 
statistically positively, while self-employed is negatively associated with the size of initial 
investment. Besides, firm size and age are negatively associated with the sales growth rate, 
which is consistent with stylized facts (Clementi and Hopenhayn, 2006).  
[Table 3 here] 
 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
This section presents our regressions results. We first gauge the relationship between access 
to informal and formal financial sources and the decision to become entrepreneur, initial 
investment and actual use of informal and formal external finance. We then relate the use of 
informal and formal external finance to firm growth. It is important to stress that we 
document correlations rather than implying causality with our regressions.  
 
4.1 Finance, entrepreneurship and initial investment 
 
Table 4 shows that our proxies for access to both informal and formal financial sources are 
significantly associated with the likelihood of running a microenterprise. Here we present 
Probit regressions for co-variates of entrepreneurship. Column (1) presents a regression with 
characteristics of the family head; column (2) adds family characteristics that proxy for 
access to financial services; column (3) adds village characteristics; column 4 restricts the 
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model specification in column 2 to the sample that is used in column (3) to account for the 
potential sample selection problem. Given data constraints, the number of observations varies 
across the three columns, though our findings are robust to this variation.12 
[Table 4 here] 
Columns (2) – (4) show that the travel time to the nearest financial institution is 
negatively related with the likelihood of running a microenterprise. Specifically, a ten percent 
lower travel time to the nearest financial institution is associated with a six percent higher 
likelihood of running a microenterprise. Wealth, as measured by durable goods, is positively 
associated with the likelihood of running a microenterprise, with a ten percent increase in 
wealth associated with a one percent increase in the likelihood. Household wealth can be seen 
as both a proxy for internal financing capacity of microenterprises as well as for possible 
collateral to receive outside informal or formal funding. The size of the family also enters 
positively and significantly, suggesting that access to more family members for possible 
funding or other support (e.g. labor) increases the likelihood that households run their own 
microenterprises. On the other hand, the number of family members and friends as potential 
lenders is not significantly associated with the likelihood of running a microenterprise. 
Similarly, gifts received and given enters only weakly significant (at most at the ten percent 
level) with a positive sign. Together, these results suggest that access to both formal 
(financial institutions) and informal sources (family members) as well as own funds 
(household wealth) are important for the decision to start a microenterprise in China.  
                                                   
12
 In robustness tests, we run the regression for column (1) with a restricted sample of columns (2) and (3), and 
for column (2) with a restricted sample of column (3). The results are similar both in magnitude and significance. 
We also conduct the same robustness checks for Table 5, and the results are quite similar. We suppress the 
results for conciseness, but they are available upon request.  
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Turning to the control variables, we note that – not surprisingly – households in urban 
areas (i.e. family heads with urban Hukou registration) are more likely to run a 
microenterprise. Among the other characteristics of the family, only age enters consistently 
across the regression with a significantly negative coefficient; families with older family 
heads are less likely to run a microenterprise. Families whose heads have education levels of 
high school or above are more likely to run microenterprises, although the coefficient is not 
significant in columns (2) – (4) when we control for family and village characteristics. 
Families whose heads are female are six to seven percent less likely to run microenterprises, 
although the coefficient enters at most at the ten percent significance level. Party membership 
and thus political connection cannot explain whether a household has a microenterprise or not.  
Among the village variables, only the dummy variable indicating bus service enters 
positively and significantly. Neither access to running water nor the average arable land per 
capita is significantly correlated with the probability of running a microenterprise.  
The regressions in Table 5 show that access to informal and formal financial services 
is also important for the size of the initial investment for the microenterprises. Column (1) 
presents a regression with characteristics of the family head; column (2) adds family 
characteristics that proxy for the access to financial services; column (3) adds village 
characteristics; column 4 restricts the model specification in column 2 to the sample that is 
used in column (3) to account for the potential sample selection problem.  
[Table 5 here] 
Here, we use OLS regressions to relate family head, family and village characteristics 
to the size of the initial investment in a microenterprise. Starting with the regressions in this 
table, we now work with the smaller sample of micro-entrepreneurs. The results suggest that 
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the size of the initial investment increases with the wealth of the household, as measured by 
durable goods, with the gifts that the family has received and given, and the size of the family. 
The size of the initial investment decreases with the distance to the nearest financial 
institution, while the number of family members and friends as potential lenders does not 
enter significantly. Interestingly and unlike in Table 4, none of the characteristics of the 
family head enters significantly. Among the village characteristics, the competition at the 
start of the enterprise, as measured by the log one plus the number of families with similar 
microenterprises in the village enters significantly and negatively, suggesting that households 
are investing less if there are already many other similar enterprises around, which could be 
both demand-driven in the product market (e.g. caution in investment decision) and supply-
driven in financial market (e.g. caution by lenders). None of the other village characteristics 
enters significantly. As for the decision to establish or not a microenterprise, the size of the 
initial investment thus depends critically on the access to own funds, informal and formal 
external funds.  
 
4.2 Finance and growth for microenterprises 
 
The results in Table 6 show that the use of informal but not of formal external finance is 
related with higher firm growth, except for self-employed entrepreneurs. Here we use OLS 
regressions to relate the sales growth between 2007 and 2008 with the dummy variables 
indicating the use of formal or formal finance plus their interaction with a dummy variable 
for self-employed micro-entrepreneurs, i.e. entrepreneurs who do not have any employee 
from outside their immediate family. The results in column (1) of Table 6 shows that the use 
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of informal finance is associated with faster firm growth in the case of multiple-employee 
firms, while the results in column (2) show that the use of formal finance is not related to 
firm growth. Both the informal finance dummy and its interaction with self-employed 
dummy enter significantly, with coefficients that are of similar size but of opposite sign 
(column (1)). This suggests that the use of informal external resources help enterprises grow, 
but only if they have employees outside the immediate family. Neither the formal finance 
dummy nor its interaction with self-employed dummy enter significantly (column (2)), while 
the combination of formal / informal external finance dummy enters positively and 
significantly and its interaction with self-employed dummy enters negatively but only 
marginally significant (P-value is 0.124 in column (3)). We get similar results in columns (4) 
– (6) when controlling for family head characteristics.13 The P-value of the interaction for 
informal finance dummy and self-employed dummy is 0.148 in column (4), and the P-value 
of the interaction for finance dummy and self-employed dummy is 0.229 in column (6). 
Besides, we also find similar results in columns (7) – (9) when controlling for village 
characteristics, where both the coefficients for informal finance dummy and its interaction 
with self-employed dummy are statistically significant.  
[Table 6 here] 
The results are not only statistically, but also economically significant. Using informal 
finance in the case of multiple-employee enterprises is associated with 17 percent higher 
growth, which compares to a mean growth rate of six percent and a standard deviation of 37 
percent. In contrast with Ayyagari et al. (2010), we find that informal finance may enhance 
                                                   
13
 We also run the regression when controlling for family characteristics, i.e. Durable Goods, Travel Time to 
Financial Institution, Family and Friends as Potential Lenders, Gift, and Family Size. We find similar results 
with a slight difference in magnitude and significance. The same case applies to Table 8 when we use loan size 
as finance variables. The results are suppressed for conciseness but are available upon request.  
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the growth of firms with employees while formal finance is irrelevant for the growth of all 
firms. It is important to note the difference in samples, however. Ayyagari et al. (2010) use a 
sample of relatively larger firms with a minimum of 20 (15) employees in the manufacturing 
(service) industry, of which 22% are state-owned and 40% are registered as corporations. In 
contrast, 70% of our sample firms are self-employed microenterprises (i.e. without 
employees), while only 12 firms have more than 20 employees (see footnote 1). In addition, 
all microenterprises are privately owned and registered as household-based enterprises (i.e. 
the so-called “individually-owned business”). The behavior of microenterprises is essentially 
different with the SMEs and large firms, which may explain the conflicting results with 
Ayyagari et al. (2010).  
The results in Table 7 confirm our previous findings that informal financing is 
associated with faster growth of enterprises with non-family employees, while formal finance 
is not. Rather than dummy variables for the use of informal and formal finance, here we use 
the logarithm of one plus total informal, total formal and total external financing, as well as 
their interaction with a self-employed dummy. While the amount of total informal financing 
enters positively and significantly, its interaction with the self-employed dummy enters 
negatively and marginally significantly (P-value is 0.106 in column (1)). We find the same 
results for the log of one plus total external financing and its interaction with the self-
employed dummy (P-value is 0.228 in column (3)), while neither the amount of formal 
financing nor its interaction with the self-employed dummy enter significantly in our 
regression (column (2)). We find similar results in columns (4) – (6) when controlling for 
family head characteristics, although the sign of informal finance in column (4) turns 
insignificant (P-value is 0.105). Furthermore, we find similar results when controlling for 
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village characteristics in columns (7) – (9) with a slight difference in magnitude and 
significance.  
[Table 7 here] 
Together, the results in Tables 6 and 7 suggest that growth of microenterprises in rural 
China can be mainly explained by the use of informal external finance, but not by the use of 
formal external finance. These results stand in contrast to our findings from the previous 
section that access to both informal and formal finance can explain whether households start 
their own enterprise. They suggest an important advantage for informal financial service 
providers in screening and monitoring creditworthy micro-entrepreneurs, while they shed 
doubt on the ability of formal financial institutions in rural China, especially Rural Credit 
Cooperatives, to contribute to firm growth. They underline the important role of informal 
finance in the presence of regulatory restrictions on formal financial institutions.  
While we find that the access to formal finance (i.e. distance to the nearest financial 
institution) is positively associated with the decision to become an entrepreneur and the size 
of the initial investment, we do not find any significant effect of the use of formal finance (i.e. 
loans outstanding from banks and credit cooperatives) on the growth of microenterprises. 
One potential reason is that households may be severely constrained in obtaining finance at 
the start-up year for the microenterprises, which makes the access to finance (i.e. both 
informal and formal finance) essential for the decision to become an entrepreneur. Banks may 
turn out be to inefficient lenders with the expansion of microenterprises (e.g. due to 
information asymmetry and connected borrowers), while informal financial providers fill in 
the gap using their proprietary information. Another reason could be that banks lend to 
informal financial institutions, which further intermediate loans to borrowers (Hoff and 
Stiglitz, 1997). As a result, the access to formal finance is positively associated with the 
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access to informal finance (i.e. see panel A of Table 3 for the negative correlation between 
the travelling time to the nearest financial institution and the number of family members and 
friends as potential lenders) and the use of informal finance (i.e. the results are suppressed for 
brevity). Thus, the access to formal finance may enhance the start-up decision of 
microenterprises and the size of initial investment. Finally, the access to formal finance may 
proxy the access to markets in general, i.e. the distance to the nearest financial institution is 
often correlated with the distance to the major markets, which may enhance the decision to 
become entrepreneurs and the size of initial investment. In sum, the access to formal finance 
is different with the use of formal finance, which may lead to diverging results among the 
start-up decision, the initial investment, and the subsequent growth of microenterprises.  
 
4.3 Additional Results and RobustnessTest 
Informal finance comprises different financing sources, e.g. family members and friends, 
informal financial institutions, and trade credits. Thus we split the informal finance into three 
categories. Table 8 shows the results for different informal financing sources. Informal 
financing from family members and friends is positively associated with the sales growth of 
microenterprises with employees in Model (1), (4) and (7) of Table 8 (i.e. marginally 
significant in Model (4)), while not for those self-employed. However, we do not find any 
significant effect of trade credit for either microenterprises with employees or those self-
employed. Furthermore, we cannot precisely estimate the effect of informal financial 
institutions on those self-employed due to insufficient variations of the data (i.e. only three 
percent have loans from informal financial institutions), while we do not find any effect on 
the microenterprises with employees either. In sum, it seems that informal financing from 
family members and friends seem to the main driver for the enhancing effect.  
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[Table 8 here] 
Our findings hold when we limit the sample to registered microenterprises. There is a 
special registration type of microenterprises in China, the “getihu” (literally translated as 
individual industrial and commercial households). Microenterprises registered as “getihu” 
must have less than eight employees, otherwise they have to be registered as other firm types. 
We obtain a subsample of “getihu” by restricting to the microenterprises with less than eight 
employees which are qualified to be registered as “getihu” (i.e. but may also be registered as 
other firm types).  312 out of 335 firms are registered as “getihu”. Table 9 shows the results 
when we use the subsample of “getihu”. We find qualitatively similar results for the informal 
finance in Model (7), although Model (1) and (4) are only marginally significant. However, 
model (2) of Table 9 shows that formal finance is positively associated with the growth of the 
“getihu” with employees, while not for those self-employed “getihu”. Formal finance does 
not enhance the microenterprises with eight or more employees due to inefficient bank loans 
in China (Bailey et al., 2011); neither does for those self-employed due to a lack of incentive 
of entrepreneurs for expansion.  
[Table 9 here] 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The effect of access to finance on entrepreneurship and microenterprise growth is of vital 
importance for poverty reduction and economic growth in developing countries. Using a 
survey dataset on Chinese rural households, we find that access to finance is positively 
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associated with the decision to start microenterprises and with the size of initial investment. 
In addition, we find that the use of informal finance is associated with higher growth of rural 
microenterprises with employees, while there is no effect for those without (i.e. self-
employed). We do not find any significant relationship between the use of formal finance and 
firm growth. In addition, we find that the relationship between informal finance and firms’ 
growth is driven by funding through friends and family.  
Our findings are complementary to the literature on the relationship between informal 
and formal finance and firm growth in China. Unlike previous papers we focus on rural China 
and micro- or household-based entrepreneurs. Our findings provide important insights into 
the relative importance of different financial service providers in rural China. They confirm 
previous evidence on the dearth and inefficiency of formal financial institution in rural China 
and point to the important role of informal financial service providers in filling the gap left by 
banks and credit cooperatives.  
China’s government has been actively pushing for the development of rural areas and 
non-export domestic sectors. Our findings point to the important role that access to financial 
services should have on this agenda. They point to the urgency of strengthening the 
contractual and regulatory frameworks for formal financial institutions in rural areas. The 
formal financial institutions have not played a proper supporting role in rural China since the 
retreat of branches in the mid-1990s. There are a number of things that the financial 
institutions and government should do in order to promote the development of 
microenterprises and poverty reduction in rural China. Increasing the competition in the 
credit market, for example, may be a solution (Chong et al., 2013; Park et al., 2003). On the 
one hand, a fiercer credit market competition can drive banks and credit cooperatives to 
expand the borrower set through more investment in relationship lending (in a similar style as 
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informal financial institutions), which may help pick those “good” borrowers in the rural area 
(i.e. those households running microenterprises with external employees). One the other hand, 
it may also push these financial institutions to provide better service for existing borrowers, 
i.e. simpler loan applications procedures, faster loan approval process, and less corruption of 
loan officers. While it is infeasible to eliminate the informal finance, the formal financial 
institutions may utilize its cost advantage (i.e. lower interest rate than informal finance) to 
provide complementary funding for those rural households in shortage of fund.  
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Table 1. Variable definitions 
Category Variable Name Variable Definitions 
Dependent 
Variable 
Microenterprise = 1 if a family has a microenterprise, 0 otherwise 
Sales Growth 2008 = log(sales in 2008) - log(sales in 2007) 
Initial Investment The logarithm of 1 plus the initial investment of a microenterprise in RMB 
Family Head 
Characteristics 
Hukou Urban = 1 if the family head has an urban Hukou registration, 0 otherwise 
Head Age The logarithm of the age of family head at a firm’s start year 
Senior Education = 1 if the family head has a high school, college or higher education 
Political Connection = 1 if the family head is a party member, 0 otherwise 
Female = 1 if the family head is female, 0 otherwise 
Family 
Characteristics 
Durable Goods The logarithm of 1 plus the value of durable goods, calculated with an annual depreciation rate of ten percent 
Travel Time to Financial 
Institution 
The logarithm of 1 plus the travel time from the household to the nearest financial 
institutions in minutes 
Family Members and Friends 
as Potential Lenders 
The logarithm of 1 plus the number of family members and friends who are potential 
lenders 
Gift The logarithm of 1 plus the gift received and given in 2008 
Family Size The number of family members 
Village 
Characteristics 
Running Water = 1 if a village has running water, 0 otherwise 
Land Per Capita in the Village Land Per Capita in the Village is the average arable land per capita in a village 
Bus = 1 if a village has bus service, 0 otherwise 
Firm-Level 
Variable 
Informal Finance Loans outstanding from family members, friends, informal financial institutions, trade 
credit, and others in 2008 year end 
Formal Finance Loans outstanding from banks and credit cooperatives in 2008 year end 
Total Finance The summation of Formal Finance and Informal Finance in 2008 year end 
Informal Finance at Start Year Loans outstanding from family members, friends, informal financial institutions, and 
others at a firm’s start year 
Formal Finance at Start Year Loans outstanding from banks and credit cooperatives at firm’s start year 
Informal = 1 if Informal Finance is positive, 0 otherwise 
Formal = 1 if Formal Finance is positive, 0 otherwise 
Finance = 1 if Total Finance is positive, 0 otherwise 
Informal at Start Year = 1 if Informal Finance at Start Year is positive, 0 otherwise 
Formal at Start Year = 1 if Formal Finance at Start Year is positive, 0 otherwise 
Finance at Start Year = 1 if either Informal Finance at Start Year or Formal Finance at Start Year is positive, 0 otherwise 
Family and Friends = 1 if loans from family members and friends are positive, 0 otherwise 
Informal Financial Institution = 1 if loans from informal financial institution are positive, 0 otherwise 
Trade Credits = 1 if trade credits from suppliers are positive, 0 otherwise 
Self-Employed = 1 if a microenterprise does not have other employees excluding the entrepreneur himself /  herself, 0 otherwise 
Firm Size The logarithm of 1 plus the sales in 2007 
Firm Age The logarithm of the number of years since the startup of a microenterprise 
Competitor at Start Year The number of competitors in the same village at a firm’s start year 
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Table 2. Summary statistics 
Microenterprise equals 1 if a family has a microenterprise, 0 otherwise. Hukou Urban equals 1 if a family head 
has an urban Hukou registration, 0 otherwise; Head Age is the logarithm of a family head’s age; Senior 
Education equals 1 if a family head has an education of high school or above, 0 otherwise; Political Connection 
equals 1 if a family head is party member, 0 otherwise; Female equals 1 if a family head is female, 0 otherwise; 
Durable Goods is the logarithm of 1 plus the value of durable goods; Travel Time to Financial Institution is the 
logarithm of 1 plus the travel time in minutes from a family to the nearest financial institution; Family Members 
and Friends as Potential Lenders is the logarithm of 1 plus the number of family members and friends who are 
potential lenders; Gift is the logarithm of 1 plus the gift received and given in 2008; Family Size is the number 
of family members; Running Water equals if a village has running water service; Land Per Capita in the Village 
is the average arable land per capita in a village; Bus equals 1 if a village has bus service, 0 otherwise. Sales 
Growth 2008 is the annual sales growth rate calculated as log difference between sales in 2008 and sales in 2007; 
Initial Investment is the logarithm of 1 plus the initial investment in the startup year of a microenterprise in 
RMB; Informal equals 1 if the microenterprise has informal finance at the end of 2008, 0 otherwise; Formal 
equals 1 if a microenterprise has formal finance at the end of 2008, 0 otherwise; Finance equals if a 
microenterprise has either informal or formal finance at the end of 2008, 0 otherwise; Informal at Start Year 
equals 1 if a microenterprise has informal finance at start year, 0 otherwise; Formal at Start Year equals 1 if a 
microenterprise has formal finance at start year, 0 otherwise; Finance at Start Year equals 1 if a microenterprise 
has either informal or formal finance at start year, 0 otherwise; Informal Finance Size equals the logarithm of 1 
plus informal finance at the end of 2008 are positive; Formal Finance Size equals the logarithm of 1 plus formal 
finance at the end of 2008 are positive; Finance Size equals the logarithm of 1 plus the informal and formal 
finance; Family and Friends equals 1 if a microenterprise has loans from family member or friends at the end of 
2008, 0 otherwise; Informal Financial Institution equals 1 if a microenterprise has loans from informal financial 
institutions at the end of 2008, 0 otherwise; Trade credit equals 1 if a microenterprise has trade credit from their 
suppliers, 0 otherwise; Self-Employed equals 1 if a microenterprise does not have other employees excluding 
the entrepreneur himself / herself, 0 otherwise; Firm Size is the logarithm of 1 plus the sales in 2007; Firm Age 
is the logarithm of the number of years since firm startup.   
Category Variable Name N Mean Median Std. Dev Min P25 P75 Max 
All Households 
Microenterprise 1,949 0.27 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Hukou Urban 1,949 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Head Age 1,946 3.87 3.89 0.26 0.00 3.71 4.06 4.45 
Senior Education 1,942 0.12 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Political Connection 1,948 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Female 1,946 0.07 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Durable Goods 1,950 5.23 7.03 3.89 0.00 0.00 8.37 13.30 
Travel Time to Financial Institution 1,913 2.62 2.40 0.85 0.00 1.79 3.04 5.48 
Family Members and Friends as 
Potential Lenders 1,820 1.62 1.61 0.93 0.00 1.10 2.20 5.30 
Gift 1,891 6.22 7.31 3.16 0.00 5.99 8.16 12.23 
Family Size 1,949 4.12 4.00 1.51 1.00 3.00 5.00 11.00 
Running Water 1,915 0.69 1.00 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Land Per Capita in the Village 1,851 0.92 0.69 0.63 0.00 0.47 1.39 2.53 
Bus 1,898 0.39 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Microenterprises 
Sales Growth 2008 344 0.06 0.00 0.37 -2.17 0.00 0.13 2.48 
Initial Investment 502 8.39 9.21 3.41 0.00 7.24 10.60 14.51 
Informal 512 0.19 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Formal 513 0.12 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Finance 511 0.26 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Informal at Start Year 515 0.39 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
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Formal at Start Year 517 0.16 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Finance at Start Year 515 0.49 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Informal Finance Size 512 1.87 0.00 3.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.85 
Formal Finance Size 513 1.20 0.00 3.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.12 
Finance Size 511 2.63 0.00 4.51 0.00 0.00 7.60 13.30 
Family and Friends 513 0.17 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Informal Financial Institution 527 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Trade Credits 527 0.05 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Self-Employed 531 0.70 1.00 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Firm Size 386 8.99 9.68 3.36 0.00 8.52 10.82 14.91 
Firm Age 528 1.90 1.95 0.93 0.00 1.10 2.64 3.69 
 
Competitor at Start Year 477 1.54 1.39 1.21 0.00 0.69 2.40 6.40 
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Table 3 Panel A. Correlation table for microenterprise. Microenterprise equals 1 if a family has a microenterprise, 0 otherwise; Initial Investment is the logarithm of 1 
plus the initial investment in the startup year of a microenterprise in RMB; Hukou Urban equals 1 if a family head has an urban Hukou registration, 0 otherwise; Head Age is 
the logarithm of a family head’s age; Senior Education equals 1 if a family head has an education of high school or above, 0 otherwise; Political Connection equals 1 if a 
family head is party member, 0 otherwise; Female equals 1 if a family head is female, 0 otherwise; Durable Goods is the logarithm of 1 plus the value of durable goods; 
Travel Time to Financial Institution is the logarithm of 1 plus the travel time in minutes from a family to the nearest financial institution; Family Members and Friends as 
Potential Lenders is the logarithm of 1 plus the number of family members and friends who are potential lenders; Gift is the logarithm of 1 plus the gift received and given in 
2008; Family Size is the number of family members; Running Water equals if a village has running water service; Land Per Capita in the Village is the average arable land 
per capita in a village; Bus equals 1 if a village has bus service, 0 otherwise. * Significance at 5% level.  
  
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] 
Microenterprise [1] 1  
            
Initial Investment [2] − 1 
            
Hukou Urban [3] 0.0582* -0.0019 1 
           
Head Age [4] -0.1034* -0.0203 0.0181 1 
          
Senior Education [5] 0.0901* 0.1150* 0.1502* -0.0701* 1 
         
Political Connection [6] 0.0000 0.0250 0.0739* 0.1145* 0.1449* 1 
        
Female [7] -0.0530* 0.0173 0.0378 0.0418 -0.0423 -0.0375 1 
       
Durable Goods [8] 0.1000* 0.4067* 0.0681* -0.0711* 0.0951* 0.0360 -0.0423 1 
      
Travel Time to Financial Institution [9] -0.1267* -0.2338* -0.0677* 0.0274 -0.1187* 0.0027 0.0367 -0.1453* 1 
     
Family Members and Friends as 
Potential Lenders [10] 0.0169 0.1022* -0.0604* -0.0612* 0.0393 0.0524* -0.0694* 0.1837* -0.0985* 1     
Gift [11] 0.0939* 0.2286* -0.0588* 0.0074 0.0777* 0.0501* -0.0489* 0.1330* -0.1465* 0.1256* 1 
   
Family Size [12] 0.1430* 0.1205* -0.1319* -0.0490* 0.0253 0.0092 -0.0516* 0.1038* 0.0779* 0.0449 0.0334 1 
  
Running Water [13] -0.0748* -0.0126 -0.0851* -0.0024 0.0082 0.0113 0.0527* -0.0209 -0.0928* 0.0035 -0.1167* -0.0620* 1 
 
Land Per Person in the Village [14] -0.1356* 0.0910* -0.0959* -0.0285 -0.0165 -0.0510* -0.0637* 0.1101* -0.0815* 0.1060* 0.0544* -0.2345* 0.0907* 1 
Bus [15] -0.0498* 0.0878 -0.0440 -0.0100 -0.0072 0.0172 -0.0624* 0.2015* -0.1936* 0.1260* -0.0117 -0.1775* 0.2490* 0.5574* 
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Panel B. Correlation table for initial investment and sales growth. Initial Investment is the logarithm of 1 plus the initial investment in the startup year of a 
microenterprise in RMB; Sales Growth 2008 is the annual sales growth rate calculated as log difference between sales in 2008 and sales in 2007; Informal equals 1 if a 
microenterprise has informal finance at the end of 2008, 0 otherwise; Formal equals 1 if a microenterprise has formal finance at the end of 2008, 0 otherwise; Finance equals 
if a microenterprise has either informal or formal finance at the end of 2008, 0 otherwise; Informal at Start Year equals 1 if a microenterprise has informal finance at start year, 
0 otherwise; Formal at Start Year equals 1 if a microenterprise has formal finance at start year, 0 otherwise; Finance at Start Year equals 1 if a microenterprise has either 
informal or formal finance at start year, 0 otherwise; Self-Employed equals 1 if a microenterprise does not have other employees excluding the entrepreneur himself / herself, 
0 otherwise; Firm Size is the logarithm of 1 plus the sales in 2007; Firm Age is the logarithm of the number of years since the startup of a microenterprise. * Significance at 5% 
level.  
  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
Sales Growth 2008 [1] 1  
      
  
Initial Investment [2] 0.0558 1 
      
  
Informal  [3] 0.0353 0.2429* 1 
     
  
Formal  [4] 0.0730 0.2054* 0.2113* 1 
    
  
Finance [5] 0.0694 0.2972* 0.8203* 0.6182* 1 
   
  
Informal at Start Year [6] -0.0045 0.4385* 0.3153* 0.0605 0.2521* 1 
  
  
Formal at Start Year  [7] 0.0537 0.2887* 0.0893* 0.5293* 0.3355* 0.0174 1 
 
  
Finance at Start Year [8] 0.0153 0.5164* 0.2776* 0.2826* 0.3752* 0.8241* 0.4513* 1   
Self-Employed [9] -0.0364 -0.1584* -0.0618 -0.0822 -0.0709 -0.0764 -0.035 -0.0688 1  
Firm Size [10] -0.1343* 0.1356* -0.0590 -0.0016 -0.0477 0.0353 0.0370 0.0687 -0.0511 1 
Firm Age [11] -0.0853 -0.2615* -0.0954* -0.0967* -0.1255* -0.1260* -0.1152* -0.1572* 0.0222 0.3593* 
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Table 4. Probit regressions for microenterprise. Dependent variable is Microenterprise, which 
equals 1 if a family has a microenterprise, 0 otherwise. Hukou Urban equals 1 if a family head has an 
urban Hukou registration, 0 otherwise; Head Age is the logarithm of a family head’s age; Senior 
Education equals 1 if a family head has an education of high school or above, 0 otherwise; Political 
Connection equals 1 if a family head is party member, 0 otherwise; Female equals 1 if a family head is 
female, 0 otherwise; Durable Goods is the logarithm of 1 plus the value of durable goods; Travel Time 
to Financial Institution is the logarithm of 1 plus the travel time in minutes from a family to the nearest 
financial institution; Family Members and Friends as Potential Lenders is the logarithm of 1 plus the 
number of family members and friends who are potential lenders; Gift is the logarithm of 1 plus the gift 
received and given in 2008; Family Size is the number of family members; Running Water equals if a 
village has running water service; Land Per Capita in the Village is the average arable land per capita 
in a village; Bus equals 1 if a village has bus service, 0 otherwise. Marginal effects and Pseudo R-
squared are reported. Column (4) restricts the specification of column (2) to the sample of column (3). 
All regressions include county dummies. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in brackets, 
significance * at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.  
Variable 
Category Variable Name (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Family Head 
Characteristics 
Hukou Urban 0.118** 0.136** 0.122** 0.115* 
 
[0.054] [0.058] [0.062] [0.060] 
Head Age -0.187*** -0.164*** -0.171*** -0.165*** 
 
[0.043] [0.044] [0.045] [0.045] 
Senior Education 0.092*** 0.048 0.060 0.060* 
 
[0.035] [0.036] [0.037] [0.037] 
Political Connection -0.016 -0.028 -0.030 -0.028 
 
[0.034] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] 
Female -0.072* -0.062 -0.068* -0.067* 
  [0.037] [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] 
Family 
Characteristics 
Durable Goods 
 
0.008** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
  
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Travel Time to Financial 
Institution  -0.057*** -0.060*** -0.065*** 
  
[0.014] [0.015] [0.014] 
Family Members and Friends 
as Potential Lenders  -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 
  
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] 
Gift 
 
0.007* 0.006 0.006 
  
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
Family Size 
 
0.035*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 
  
 
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
Village 
Characteristics 
Running Water 
  
0.029  
   
[0.036]  
Land Per Capita in the 
Village   -0.048  
   
[0.034]  
Bus 
  
0.084*  
   
[0.045]  
     
 
 
County Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Observations 1,933 1,720 1,639 1,639 
  Pseudo R-squared 0.052 0.084 0.095 0.092 
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Table 5. OLS regressions for initial investment. Dependent variable is the logarithm of 1 plus the 
initial investment for the microenterprise in RMB. Hukou Urban equals 1 if a family head has an urban 
Hukou registration, 0 otherwise; Head Age is the logarithm of a family head’s age; Senior Education 
equals 1 if a family head has an education of high school or above, 0 otherwise; Political Connection 
equals 1 if a family head is party member, 0 otherwise; Female equals 1 if a family head is female, 0 
otherwise; Durable Goods is the logarithm of 1 plus the value of durable goods; Travel Time to 
Financial Institution is the logarithm of 1 plus travel time in minutes from a family to the nearest 
financial institution; Family Members and Friends as Potential Lenders is the logarithm of 1 plus the 
number of family members and friends who are potential lenders; Gift is the logarithm of 1 plus gift 
received and given in 2008; Family Size is the number of family members; Competitors at Start Year is 
the logarithm of 1 plus the number of families with similar microenterprises within a village; Running 
Water equals if a village has running water service; Land Per Capita in the Village is the average arable 
land per capita in a village; Bus equals 1 if a village has bus service, 0 otherwise. Column (4) restricts 
the specification of column (2) to the sample of column (3). All regressions include county dummies. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in brackets, significance * at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Family 
Head 
Characterist
ics 
Hukou Urban -0.030 -0.131 0.519 0.563 
 
[0.652] [0.669] [0.708] [0.690] 
Head Age -0.239 -0.096 -0.505 -0.306 
 
[0.668] [0.671] [0.682] [0.691] 
Senior Education 0.501 0.553 0.455 0.426 
 
[0.368] [0.372] [0.401] [0.407] 
Political Connection 0.076 -0.203 -0.389 -0.309 
 
[0.533] [0.476] [0.496] [0.496] 
Female 0.477 -0.091 -0.250 -0.335 
 
[0.618] [0.642] [0.644] [0.663] 
Family 
Characterist
ics 
Durable Goods 
 
0.246*** 0.208*** 0.227*** 
  
[0.037] [0.039] [0.039] 
Travel Time to Financial 
Institution  -0.749*** -0.852*** -0.760*** 
  
[0.183] [0.198] [0.195] 
Family Members and Friends as 
Potential Lenders  0.088 0.054 0.056 
  
[0.155] [0.157] [0.162] 
Gift 
 
0.141*** 0.108* 0.125** 
  
[0.053] [0.058] [0.059] 
Family Size 
 
0.316** 0.295** 0.289** 
  
[0.124] [0.140] [0.139] 
Village 
Characterist
ics 
Competitors at Start Year 
  
-0.386***  
   
[0.141]  
Running Water 
  
-0.679  
   
[0.431]  
Land Per Capita in the Village 
  
0.032  
   
[0.431]  
Bus 
  
0.889  
   
[0.581]  
 
 
    
 Constant 8.582*** 6.574** 10.510*** 8.379*** 
 
 
[2.745] [2.691] [2.758] [2.753] 
 County Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Observations 495 438 377 377 
 R-squared 0.230 0.401 0.392 0.367 
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Table 6. OLS regressions for the firm growth. Dependent variable is Sales Growth 2008. Informal 
equals 1 if a microenterprise has informal finance at the end of 2008, 0 otherwise; Formal equals 1 if a 
microenterprise has formal finance at the end of 2008, 0 otherwise; Finance equals 1 if a 
microenterprise has either informal or formal finance, 0 otherwise; Self-Employed equals 1 if a 
microenterprise does not have other employees excluding the entrepreneur himself / herself, 0 
otherwise; Firm Size is the logarithm of 1 plus the sales in 2007; Firm Age is the logarithm of the age 
of a microenterprise; Hukou Urban equals 1 if a family head has a urban Hukou registration, 0 
otherwise; Head Age is the logarithm of the family head’s age; Senior Education equals 1 if a family 
head has an education of high school or above, 0 otherwise; Political Connection equals 1 if a family 
head is party member, 0 otherwise; Female equals 1 if a family head is female, 0 otherwise; Running 
Water equals if a village has running water service; Land Per Capita in the Village is the average arable 
land per capita in a village; Bus equals 1 if a village has bus service, 0 otherwise. All regressions 
include industry and county dummies. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in brackets, 
significance * at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Finance  
Variables 
Informal Finance 0.166** 
  
0.160*   0.177**   
 
[0.083] 
  
[0.095]   [0.085]   
Formal Finance 
 
0.121 
 
 0.114   0.113  
  
[0.097] 
 
 [0.104]   [0.096]  
Finance 
  
0.167**   0.154*   0.162** 
   
[0.076]   [0.087]   [0.076] 
Informal Finance 
× Self-Employed -0.172*   -0.154   -0.185*   
 
[0.097] 
  
[0.106]   [0.100]   
Formal Finance 
× Self-Employed  -0.063   -0.054   -0.105  
  
[0.193] 
 
 [0.198]   [0.191]  
Finance × Self-Employed 
  
-0.157   -0.136   -0.172* 
   
[0.102]   [0.113]   [0.102] 
Firm  
Characteristics 
Self-Employed -0.058 -0.076 -0.049 -0.055 -0.069 -0.048 -0.058 -0.073 -0.048 
 
[0.057] [0.056] [0.055] [0.058] [0.058] [0.056] [0.059] [0.057] [0.057] 
Firm Size -0.036** -0.037** -0.038** -0.034* -0.034* -0.035* -0.038** -0.038** -0.039** 
 
[0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.019] [0.018] [0.019] [0.018] [0.019] [0.019] 
Firm Age -0.038 -0.035 -0.037 -0.047 -0.044 -0.046 -0.037 -0.036 -0.036 
 
[0.034] [0.033] [0.034] [0.035] [0.034] [0.035] [0.035] [0.034] [0.034] 
Family Head 
Characteristics 
Hukou Urban 
   
-0.003 -0.001 -0.001    
    
[0.055] [0.055] [0.055]    
Head Age 
   
0.135 0.135 0.133    
    
[0.104] [0.102] [0.108]    
Senior Education 
   
0.031 0.023 0.029    
    
[0.049] [0.049] [0.049]    
Political Connection 
   
-0.011 -0.014 -0.008    
    
[0.050] [0.051] [0.050]    
Female 
   
0.147 0.144 0.139    
    
[0.113] [0.113] [0.116]    
Village  
Characteristics 
Running Water 
   
   0.092 0.083 0.089 
    
   [0.057] [0.058] [0.057] 
Land Per Capita in the 
Village       0.053 0.056 0.053 
    
   [0.058] [0.055] [0.056] 
Bus 
   
   -0.270** -0.271*** -0.267** 
    
   [0.115] [0.104] [0.111] 
 Constant 0.456 0.466 0.466 -0.077 -0.078 -0.060 0.408 0.419 0.414 
 
 
[0.328] [0.333] [0.342] [0.496] [0.494] [0.497] [0.338] [0.346] [0.350] 
 County Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Observations 335 335 335 329 329 329 315 315 315 
 R-squared 0.094 0.090 0.096 0.101 0.099 0.103 0.127 0.122 0.128 
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Table 7. Loan size. Dependent variable is the Sales Growth in 2008. Informal Finance Size equals the 
logarithm of 1 plus informal finance at the end of 2008; Formal Finance Size equals the logarithm of 1 
plus formal finance at the end of 2008; Finance Size equals the logarithm of 1 plus the informal and 
formal finance; Self-Employed equals 1 if a microenterprise does not have other employees excluding 
the entrepreneur himself / herself, 0 otherwise; Firm Size is the logarithm of 1 plus the sales in 2007; 
Firm Age is the logarithm of the age of a microenterprise; Hukou Urban equals 1 if a family head has a 
urban Hukou registration, 0 otherwise; Head Age is the logarithm of the family head’s age; Senior 
Education equals 1 if a family head has an education of high school or above, 0 otherwise; Political 
Connection equals 1 if a family head is party member, 0 otherwise; Female equals 1 if a family head is 
female, 0 otherwise; Running Water equals if a village has running water service; Land Per Capita in 
the Village is the average arable land per capita in a village; Bus equals 1 if a village has bus service, 0 
otherwise. All regressions include industry and county dummies. Heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors are in brackets, significance * at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Finance  
Variables 
Informal Finance Size 0.016* 
  
0.015   0.017**   
 
[0.008] 
  
[0.009]   [0.008]   
Formal Finance Size 
 
0.010 
 
 0.010   0.010  
  
[0.009] 
 
 [0.009]   [0.009]  
Finance Size 
  
0.015**   0.014*   0.015** 
   
[0.007]   [0.008]   [0.007] 
Informal Finance Size -0.015 
  
-0.013   -0.016*   
× Self-Employed [0.009] 
  
[0.010]   [0.010]   
Formal Finance Size 
 
-0.003 
 
 -0.002   -0.007  
× Self-Employed 
 
[0.021] 
 
 [0.021]   [0.021]  
Finance Size 
  
-0.012   -0.010   -0.014 
× Self-Employed 
  
[0.010]   [0.011]   [0.010] 
Firm  
Characteristics 
Self-Employed -0.061 -0.079 -0.055 -0.059 -0.072 -0.053 -0.062 -0.076 -0.054 
 
[0.056] [0.056] [0.055] [0.058] [0.058] [0.056] [0.058] [0.057] [0.057] 
Firm Size -0.037** -0.038** -0.039** -0.035* -0.034* -0.037* -0.039** -0.038** -0.040** 
 
[0.018] [0.018] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] 
Firm Age -0.038 -0.035 -0.036 -0.047 -0.044 -0.046 -0.037 -0.036 -0.036 
 
[0.034] [0.033] [0.034] [0.035] [0.033] [0.034] [0.035] [0.033] [0.034] 
Family Head 
Characteristics 
Hukou Urban 
   
-0.007 -0.001 -0.005    
    
[0.056] [0.055] [0.056]    
Head Age 
   
0.136 0.134 0.133    
    
[0.104] [0.102] [0.108]    
Senior Education 
   
0.030 0.023 0.029    
    
[0.049] [0.049] [0.049]    
Political Connection 
   
-0.011 -0.014 -0.008    
    
[0.050] [0.051] [0.051]    
Female 
   
0.147 0.146 0.140    
    
[0.113] [0.113] [0.116]    
Village  
Characteristics 
Running Water 
   
   0.092 0.083 0.088 
    
   [0.057] [0.058] [0.057] 
Land Per Capita in the 
Village       0.053 0.055 0.054 
    
   [0.058] [0.055] [0.057] 
Bus 
   
   -0.271** -0.269*** -0.266** 
    
   [0.115] [0.102] [0.110] 
 Constant 0.470 0.468 0.482 -0.065 -0.073 -0.047 0.423 0.422 0.429 
 
 
[0.330] [0.333] [0.346] [0.498] [0.494] [0.498] [0.340] [0.346] [0.353] 
 County Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Observations 335 335 335 329 329 329 315 315 315 
 R-squared 0.093 0.091 0.096 0.100 0.099 0.103 0.127 0.122 0.128 
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Table 8. Various sources of informal finance. Dependent variable is the Sales Growth in 2008. 
Family and Friends equals 1 if a microenterprise has loans from family member or friends at the end of 
2008, 0 otherwise; Informal Financial Institution equals 1 if a microenterprise has loans from informal 
financial institutions at the end of 2008, 0 otherwise; Trade credit equals 1 if a microenterprise has 
trade credit from their suppliers, 0 otherwise; Self-Employed equals 1 if a microenterprise does not 
have other employees excluding the entrepreneur himself / herself, 0 otherwise; Firm Size is the 
logarithm of 1 plus the sales in 2007; Firm Age is the logarithm of the age of a microenterprise; Hukou 
Urban equals 1 if a family head has a urban Hukou registration, 0 otherwise; Head Age is the logarithm 
of the family head’s age; Senior Education equals 1 if a family head has an education of high school or 
above, 0 otherwise; Political Connection equals 1 if a family head is party member, 0 otherwise; 
Female equals 1 if a family head is female, 0 otherwise; Running Water equals if a village has running 
water service; Land Per Capita in the Village is the average arable land per capita in a village; Bus 
equals 1 if a village has bus service, 0 otherwise. All regressions include industry and county dummies. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in brackets, significance * at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Finance  
Variables 
Family and Friends 0.165* 
  
0.159   0.183*   
 
[0.091] 
  
[0.105]   [0.094]   
Informal Financial Institution 
 
0.079 
 
 0.047   0.069  
  
[0.087] 
 
 [0.123]   [0.088]  
Trade credit 
  
0.101   0.093   0.089 
   
[0.073]   [0.069]   [0.076] 
Family and Friends -0.169 
  
-0.147   -0.190*   
× Self-Employed [0.105] 
  
[0.117]   [0.110]   
Informal Financial Institution 
 
- 
 
 -   -  
× Self-Employed 
 
- 
 
 -   -  
Trade Credit 
  
-0.149   -0.270*   -0.136 
× Self-Employed 
  
[0.101]   [0.152]   [0.109] 
Firm  
Characteristics 
Self-Employed -0.061 -0.082 -0.081 -0.059 -0.074 -0.073 -0.061 -0.083 -0.082 
 
[0.057] [0.055] [0.054] [0.058] [0.057] [0.056] [0.059] [0.056] [0.056] 
Firm Size -0.035** -0.035** -0.036** -0.032* -0.032* -0.032* -0.036** -0.037** -0.037** 
 
[0.018] [0.017] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] 
Firm Age -0.038 -0.038 -0.038 -0.047 -0.047 -0.046 -0.037 -0.038 -0.038 
 
[0.034] [0.035] [0.034] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] 
Family Head 
Characteristics 
Hukou Urban 
   
-0.004 -0.004 0.008    
    
[0.055] [0.061] [0.056]    
Head Age 
   
0.140 0.137 0.133    
    
[0.104] [0.104] [0.105]    
Senior Education 
   
0.029 0.025 0.027    
    
[0.049] [0.049] [0.049]    
Political Connection 
   
-0.012 -0.016 -0.016    
    
[0.050] [0.050] [0.050]    
Female 
   
0.148 0.148 0.158    
    
[0.112] [0.111] [0.118]    
Village  
Characteristics 
Running Water 
   
   0.092 0.087 0.087 
    
   [0.058] [0.058] [0.058] 
Land Per Capita in the Village 
   
   0.053 0.054 0.054 
    
   [0.057] [0.057] [0.058] 
Bus 
   
   -0.270** -0.276** -0.276** 
    
   [0.115] [0.116] [0.116] 
 Constant 0.443 0.464 0.467 -0.103 -0.089 -0.077 0.394 0.421 0.423 
 
 
[0.327] [0.329] [0.330] [0.495] [0.503] [0.501] [0.338] [0.339] [0.341] 
 County Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Observations 335 335 335 329 329 329 315 315 315 
 R-squared 0.093 0.086 0.087 0.100 0.095 0.096 0.127 0.120 0.120 
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Table 9. Microenterprises with less than eight employees (getihu). Dependent variable is Sales 
Growth 2008. Informal equals 1 if a microenterprise has informal finance at the end of 2008, 0 
otherwise; Formal equals 1 if a microenterprise has formal finance at the end of 2008, 0 otherwise; 
Finance equals 1 if a microenterprise has either informal or formal finance, 0 otherwise; Self-Employed 
equals 1 if a microenterprise does not have other employees excluding the entrepreneur himself / 
herself, 0 otherwise; Firm Size is the logarithm of 1 plus the sales in 2007; Firm Age is the logarithm of 
the age of a microenterprise; Hukou Urban equals 1 if a family head has a urban Hukou registration, 0 
otherwise; Head Age is the logarithm of the family head’s age; Senior Education equals 1 if a family 
head has an education of high school or above, 0 otherwise; Political Connection equals 1 if a family 
head is party member, 0 otherwise; Female equals 1 if a family head is female, 0 otherwise; Running 
Water equals if a village has running water service; Land Per Capita in the Village is the average arable 
land per capita in a village; Bus equals 1 if a village has bus service, 0 otherwise. All regressions 
include industry and county dummies. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in brackets, 
significance * at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Finance  
Variables 
Informal Finance 0.017 
  
0.017   0.019*   
 
[0.011] 
  
[0.012]   [0.011]   
Formal Finance 
 
0.019* 
 
 0.018   0.018  
  
[0.011] 
 
 [0.012]   [0.011]  
Finance 
  
0.020**   0.020*   0.021** 
   
[0.009]   [0.010]   [0.009] 
Informal Finance 
× Self-Employed -0.016   -0.015   -0.018   
 
[0.011] 
  
[0.013]   [0.012]   
Formal Finance 
× Self-Employed  -0.011   -0.010   -0.015  
  
[0.022] 
 
 [0.023]   [0.022]  
Finance × Self-Employed 
  
-0.018   -0.016   -0.019* 
   
[0.011]   [0.013]   [0.012] 
Firm  
Characteristics 
Self-Employed -0.063 -0.077 -0.048 -0.058 -0.067 -0.044 -0.062 -0.075 -0.046 
 
[0.061] [0.061] [0.061] [0.063] [0.063] [0.063] [0.064] [0.062] [0.063] 
Firm Size -0.039* -0.041* -0.040* -0.036 -0.037 -0.038* -0.041* -0.042* -0.042* 
 
[0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.022] [0.022] [0.023] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] 
Firm Age -0.050 -0.047 -0.050 -0.059 -0.055 -0.059 -0.049 -0.048 -0.049 
 
[0.036] [0.034] [0.035] [0.037] [0.035] [0.036] [0.036] [0.034] [0.035] 
Family Head 
Characteristics 
Hukou Urban 
   
-0.011 -0.003 -0.007    
    
[0.055] [0.054] [0.055]    
Head Age 
   
0.114 0.108 0.112    
    
[0.110] [0.107] [0.114]    
Senior Education 
   
0.027 0.015 0.024    
    
[0.054] [0.055] [0.055]    
Political Connection 
   
-0.009 -0.009 -0.006    
    
[0.056] [0.056] [0.056]    
Female 
   
0.152 0.145 0.141    
    
[0.114] [0.116] [0.119]    
Village  
Characteristics 
Running Water 
   
   0.106* 0.094 0.102* 
    
   [0.059] [0.060] [0.058] 
Land Per Capita in the 
Village       0.064 0.067 0.063 
    
   [0.059] [0.056] [0.057] 
Bus 
   
   -0.282** -0.275*** -0.273** 
    
   [0.118] [0.104] [0.112] 
 Constant 0.501 0.509 0.503 0.049 0.064 0.056 0.446 0.458 0.444 
 
 
[0.352] [0.356] [0.367] [0.556] [0.554] [0.555] [0.363] [0.370] [0.375] 
 County Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Observations 312 312 312 306 306 306 292 292 292 
 R-squared 0.097 0.098 0.103 0.102 0.104 0.108 0.133 0.132 0.138 
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Appendix 1 
 
Panel A. Sample distribution of surveyed families by county 
Province County Number of Families 
Number of Families with 
Microenterprises 
Yunnan 
(129 counties in the province) 
Yiliang 246 62 
Nanjian 212 36 
Songming 232 74 
Hunan 
(122 counties in the province) 
Sangzhi 202 55 
Yueyang 216 85 
Liling 240 97 
Heilongjiang 
(128 counties in the province) 
Longjiang 200 33 
Dongning 230 40 
Mohe 173 51 
Total - 1,951 533 
 
 
Panel B. Sample distribution of microenterprises by industry 
Industry Name Number of Observations 
Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry and Fishing 41 
Mining 8 
Manufacturing 63 
Construction 52 
Transportation 75 
Commerce 154 
Catering 40 
Health Care 10 
Culture and Entertainment 8 
Service 62 
Other 20 
Total 533 
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Appendix 2 
 
Panel A. Loan sources by county 
      
Percent of Microenterprises with 
Informal Finance 
Percent of Microenterprises with 
Formal Finance 
Percent of Microenterprises with 
Finance 
Province County Name N Start Year 2008 Year End Start Year 2008 Year End Start Year 2008 Year End 
Yunnan 
Yiliang 62 0.26 0.22 0.24 0.20 0.44 0.35 
Nanjian 36 0.35 0.18 0.21 0.09 0.50 0.21 
Songming 74 0.44 0.16 0.27 0.11 0.52 0.22 
Hunan 
Sangzhi 55 0.35 0.14 0.23 0.25 0.50 0.32 
Yueyang 85 0.37 0.17 0.05 0.04 0.39 0.18 
Liling 97 0.46 0.24 0.17 0.11 0.57 0.29 
Heilongjiang 
Longjiang 33 0.67 0.39 0.03 0.06 0.67 0.39 
Dongning 40 0.36 0.10 0.15 0.13 0.46 0.20 
Mohe 51 0.34 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.38 0.19 
Total - 533 0.39 0.19 0.16 0.12 0.49 0.26 
 
 
Panel B. Loan sources by industry 
  
Percent of Microenterprises with 
Informal Finance 
Percent of Microenterprises with 
Formal Finance 
Percent of Microenterprises with 
Finance 
Industry Name N Start Year 2008 Year End Start Year 2008 Year End Start Year 2008 Year End 
Agriculture, Forestry, Animal 
Husbandry and Fishing 41 0.15 0.10 0.18 0.15 0.28 0.21 
Mining 8 0.63 0.43 0.25 0.57 0.63 0.71 
Manufacturing 63 0.41 0.26 0.23 0.11 0.56 0.29 
Construction 52 0.15 0.17 0.13 0.10 0.23 0.26 
Transportation 75 0.56 0.26 0.32 0.17 0.75 0.37 
Commerce 154 0.42 0.19 0.10 0.11 0.48 0.26 
Catering 40 0.45 0.18 0.11 0.05 0.53 0.21 
Health Care 10 0.40 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.50 0.20 
Culture and Entertainment 8 0.63 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.63 0.57 
Service 62 0.31 0.13 0.09 0.03 0.38 0.13 
Other 20 0.45 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.50 0.10 
Total 533 0.39 0.19 0.16 0.12 0.49 0.26 
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Appendix 3 
Timeline of laws and regulations related with rural financial system in China 
Release 
date Name Note Institution 
1993/12/25 Resolutions on the financial 
system reform 
It stipulates the reform in the rural 
financial system, e.g. rural credit 
cooperative, rural cooperative 
foundation, rural cooperative bank, etc.  
State Council 
1996/8/20 Resolutions on the rural 
financial system reform 
The basic law for the reform of the 
rural financial system.  
State Council 
1998/7/13 The prohibition act of illegal 
financial institutions and illegal 
financial business 
It stipulates the types of illegal 
financial institutions that should be 
suppressed and forbidden.  
State Council 
1998/10/14 Resolutions on several major 
issues on the agriculture and 
rural area 
It raises the role of micro-credit in 
intermediating the fund for poverty 
reduction.  
CCCPC 
1999/1 No.3 file of the State Council of 
1999 
It suppresses and forbids the rural 
cooperative foundation.  
State Council 
2004/12/31 No.1 file of the CCCPC for 2005 It encourages the setting up of micro-
credit companies in the rural area 
CCCPC 
2008/4/12 Notice of the People's Bank of 
China and the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission on the 
Relevant Policies for Village 
Banks, Loan Companies, Rural 
Mutual Cooperatives and Small 
Loan Companies 
It stipulates the basic regulatory rules 
for the major financial institutions 
which are engaged in the microfinance.  
PBOC and 
CBRC 
2008/5/4  Guiding comments on the pilot 
of micro-credit companies 
The basic law for micro-credit 
companies, e.g. rules on their setting-
up procedures, funding sources, and 
regulatory rules on their businesses.  
PBOC and 
CBRC 
2014/3/13 Administrative licensing rules for 
rural small- and medium sized 
financial institutions 
It stipulates the registration and 
regulatory rules for the rural 
commercial bank, rural cooperative 
bank, rural credit cooperative, village 
bank, loan company, and rural mutual 
cooperative.  
CBRC 
Abbreviations: CCCPC is the central committee of the China communist party; PBOC is People’s 
Bank of China; CBRC is the China Banking Regulatory Commission.  
